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ANALYSIS OF BANK PERFORMANCE IN CALIFORNIA
AND THE REST OF THE TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE
DISTRICT
STOYU I. IVANOV
SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
In this study I examine the performance and sensitivity of performance to macro
factors of banks headquartered in California and banks headquartered in the rest of the
states in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. I find that prior to the financial crisis
which started in the fourth quarter of 2007 the non-California banks outperformed
California banks; however, towards the end of the financial crisis California banks
outperformed non-California banks. I also find higher macro factor sensitivities of nonCalifornia banks indicating more macro risk carried by these institutions. The higher
risk explains the superior performance in expansions and underperformance in
recessions of these banks. This fact suggests that non-California banks in the 12th
Federal Reserve District are more nationwide oriented whereas California banks still
tend to focus more on the local California economy.
INTRODUCTION
Bardhan and Walker (2010) document the effects of the “Great Recession” in the
US and suggest that California has been in the foundation of this crisis. They argue that
the mortgage problems intensity has been amplified by the activities of the banking
sector. The study by Bardhan and Walker (2010) is related to a much more fundamental
question addressed earlier by Allen (2001) – Do financial institutions matter and what
is their role in society? Allen (2001) discusses the fact that in finance theory the
perspective of individual investors is taken and the role of institutions is ignored.
However, in reality investors usually do not directly invest in financial assets but rather
invest indirectly through financial institutions. Considering the most recent crisis where
institutions have clearly destroyed value their importance becomes apparent. Therefore,
more research is needed in relation to the financial institutions importance, both
theoretical and empirical.
In this study I examine the performance of banks headquartered in California in
comparison to banks headquartered in the rest of the states in the Twelfth Federal
Reserve District around the most recent crisis. I propose a new way of examining
interstate banking integration and performance by using a macro factors framework
developed by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). I examine what is the sensitivity of the
sample of banks’ performance to the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) macro factors. This is a
new way of approaching the problem because most regional bank studies tend to focus
on the relation of bank performance and local factors, not macro factors.
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This study attempts to fill the void in the bank performance literature by
examining the relation of bank performance and the overall market conditions. I find
that California has more banks than the rest of the states in the 12 th Federal Reserve
District combined which is not surprising considering that California is the 8th largest
economy in the world. I also find that prior to the financial crisis which started in the
fourth quarter of 2007 the non-California banks outperformed California banks;
however, towards the end of the financial crisis California banks outperformed nonCalifornia banks. Additionally, I find that this better performance is due to the fact that
non-California banks bear more macro risk. The higher correlation with the macro
factors suggests that non-California banks in the 12th Federal Reserve District are more
interstate oriented relative to California banks which still tend to focus on the local
California economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2 discusses relevant
literature. Section 3 gives a brief description of used methodology. Section 4 describes
data used in the study and provides discussion of major findings and robustness tests.
Section 5 offers robustness tests and Section 6 concludes the analysis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper expands on the Clark-Neely and Wheelock (1997) study of the factors
affecting the performance of banks across states. They find that bank earnings are
predominantly related to the local state business climate and to a lesser extent to the
national economy business climate. This paper is also related to a study by Levonian
(1994) who examines the benefits of diversification in the Twelfth Federal Reserve
District. He shows that the cross correlations of bank returns in the district suggest
great potential for diversification. However, the Clark-Neely and Wheelock (1997) and
the Levonian (1994) studies have been performed prior to the passage of the Riegel-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. This act allows for
diversification of bank operations across states, which naturally has had an influence on
bank performance. This fact calls for re-examination of the relation of bank
performance and the national economy business climate and motivates this study.
During the time of Riegel-Neal, Glass-Steagall has been active. Glass-Steagall created
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and clearly delineated the three banking
sectors - commercial banking, investment banking and insurance business. The act was
intended to break the “House of Morgan” in 1933. Gramm-Leach-Bliley act repealed
Glass-Steagall in 1999 and allowed activities in all three sectors of banking regardless of
the institution. Many blame the financial deregulation of Gramm-Leach-Bliley for the
most recent financial crisis (Paletta and Scannell, 2009).
Other studies have examined the benefits interstate bank diversification;
however, to the best of my knowledge this is the first study to examine bank
performance and correlation with national economy and the first study to use Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) macro factors as proxies of the state of the national economy.
Rose (1996) examines the accelerated interstate diversification of banks due to state
changes enabling interstate diversification and also the passage of the Riegel-Neal
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Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which became effective in 1997.
The author finds increased risk levels of firms engaged in interstate diversification. Rose
identifies threshold diversification levels by different geographic classifications. He
finds that if a bank is present in three or more Federal Reserve Bank districts it would
experience lower insolvency probability and volatility of return on equity. Rose also
finds lowest correlation ratios among small and medium sized banks, which suggests
that they would benefit the most from interstate diversification. He finds that the largest
banks have high correlations indicating lower diversification benefits if combined. In
contrast to Rose’s (1996) findings, Shiers (2002) finds that economic and geographic
diversification reduce bank risk.
Zou, Miller and Malamud (2011) concur with Rose’s (1996) findings that small
banks experience decrease in risk levels due to interstate diversification. Zou, Miller and
Malamud find that medium-sized banks experience increase in risk due to the interstate
diversification. They find mixed results for large banks. They also find that small and
medium sized banks’ performance is related to state level macro variables but that large
bank performance is not related to state level macro variables.
The Federal Reserve District Banks provide several studies of bank performance
conducted naturally by region. For example, Zimmerman (1996) examines the
performance of California community banks. These banks have small scale operations
heavily influenced by local real estate and building conditions. The author finds
underperformance of these banks relative to larger scale state banks which he endows to
the local market focus.
METHODOLOGY
In this study I attempt to answer the question: “Do banks in California indeed
perform worse than banks headquartered in the rest of the states in the Twelfth Federal
Reserve District during the most recent crisis?” as suggested by Bardhan and Walker
(2010). Thus, the working null hypothesis of this study is that California banks have
worse performance than non-California banks in the 12th Federal Reserve District. I
perform univariate and multivariate analysis to test the hypothesis.
First, I examine the state and performance of California banks and banks in the
remaining states in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. The Twelfth Federal Reserve
District includes the following nine states - Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. The Twelfth District also includes the following
US territories which are excluded from the analysis - Guam, American Samoa, and the
Northern Mariana Islands. I use return on equity (ROE) and return on total assets
(ROA) as measures of bank performance.
I also examine how the performance of California and non-California banks
correlates with Chen, Roll, and Ross’s (1986) macro factors. The regression analysis
using these factors as independent variables produces factor loadings which can be
interpreted as macro risk sensitivities of the examined banks. Chen, Roll, and Ross
(1986) consider as factors the spread between long and short term interest rates (UTS),
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expected (DEI) and unexpected (UI) inflation, change in industrial production (MP),
high and low grade bonds spread (UPR), and change in oil prices (OP). In this study, I
examine how well returns of banks in California and the rest of the Twelfth Federal
Reserve Bank District correlate with Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) macro factors.
I retrieve Industrial Production: Major Industry Group (manufacturing by SIC)
seasonally adjusted data, 3-month T-Bill rate of returns, 10 year maturity government
bond nominal returns and Moody’s Seasoned Baa rated corporate bond returns from the
Federal Reserve website with a base of 100 set in 2002. The Federal Reserve website is:
http://www.federalreserve.gov. The inflation data, Consumer Price Index: US All Item
with the base of 100 set in 1982-1984, are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics website is: http://data.bls.gov. The price of oil is obtained
from the United States Department of Energy. The United States Department of Energy
website is: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_m.htm. The expected
inflation data for the period February, 1997 to end of 2007 using Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS) are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland website is: http://www.clevelandfed.org/
research/data/tips/index.cfm. The way the Cleveland Fed calculates expected inflation
is by subtracting the return on the TIPS bond from an appropriate treasury note, and by
compensating for two specific types of biases: inflation premium bias and liquidity bias.
The unexpected inflation is then calculated by subtracting expected inflation from the
actual inflation rate.
I use multivariate analysis to examine what is the relation of bank performance
and the national economy. The regression analysis factor loadings can be interpreted as
macro risk sensitivities of the examined banks. The multivariate analysis model that I
use in this study to test this relation is as follows:
n

Pi ,q   0  1UTSq   2 DEI q   3UI q   4 MPq   5UPRq   6 OPq    jV j ,i ,q   q ,

(1)

j 7

where Pi ,q is the performance measure, ROE or ROA for bank i in quarter q, UTS q is the
spread between long and short term interest rates in quarter q, DEIq is expected
inflation in quarter q, UIq is unexpected inflation in quarter q, MPq is industrial
production in quarter q, UPRq is high and low grade bonds spread in quarter q, OPq is
oil price in quarter q, V j ,i ,q are control variables for firm i in quarter q and  q is the error
term. Similar to Shiers (2002) I use several control variables in the regression analysis.
The control variables that I use in this study are a dummy variable accounting for the
crisis period of 2007, total bank deposits, number of domestic bank offices, small,
medium and large banks dummy variables, credit card banks, savings and commercial
banks. The 2007 crisis period dummy variable can be used to test directly the null
hypothesis of the study.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The data used in this study are quarterly and are obtained from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s website for the period fourth quarter 2002 until first
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quarter 2011. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s website is: http://
www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.
First, I examine the relative performance of California banks and banks in the
remaining states in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. The bank samples in the two
regions are relatively similar in size: there are 442 unique bank institutions in California
and 435 unique banks in the rest of the 12th Fed District in the examined period. The fact
that California has more banks than the rest of the states in the 12 th Federal Reserve
District combined is not surprising considering that California is the 8 th largest economy
in the world. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on total assets, equity, net income,
return on assets, return on equity and debt ratio over 34 quarters. The table indicates
that the banks in California are on average smaller than the non-California banks in the
examined period. The average total assets of California banks are $2,108,640,000
whereas the average total assets of non-California banks are $3,854,355,000. The table
also shows that banks in California have equity capital of $221,839,000 than nonCalifornia banks which have $430,501,000, which naturally translates to higher debt
ratios of California banks versus non-California banks. California banks’ net income is
on average $11,335,000 whereas the non-California bank average net income is higher
at $18,219,000. This however might be due to the fact that the non-California banks are
larger. Thus, to eliminate the influence of size in the analysis I employ relative
performance measures return on assets and return on equity.

N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
California Banks
Net
Return On
Assets
Equity
Income
Equity
10032
9999
9999
9997
2108640
221839
11335
3.25%
12786784
1262976
123500
21.51%
1782
-4565197 -4585493 477.32%
310278210
25244641
3729000 207.89%

Return On
Assets
9999
0.11%
3.04%
-54.95%
27.05%

Debt
Ratio
9999
86%
13%
1%
119%

Non-California Banks
Net
Return On Return On
Debt
Assets
Equity
Income
Equity
Assets
Ratio
N
10839
10839
10839
10836
10839
10839
Mean
3854355
430501
18219
4.30%
0.82%
85%
Standard Deviation
48241967
4396494
227208
42.06%
9.24%
14%
Minimum
1391
-40551 -6215000 2273.91%
-119.63%
0%
Maximum
1292503000 127090000
9338000
459.24%
274.21%
116%
Assets is total assets, and equity is total shareholders’ equity. Assets, equity, and net
income are measured in dollars. Data is from the fourth quarter of 2002 until first
quarter of 2011.
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California banks exhibit smaller return on assets and return on equity levels than
non-California banks. The California banks’ return on equity and return on assets
performance measures are 3.25% and 0.11%, whereas the non-California bank
performance measures are 4.30% and 0.82%, respectively.
Thus, at a first glance the average performance of California banks is worse than
the performance of banks in the rest of the 12th Federal Reserve District in the examined
period, which is in support of the working null hypothesis. However, when the
performance measures are examined across time this fact becomes less certain. The
temporal behavior of return on equity of California and non-California banks is
presented in Figure 1. Indeed prior to the financial crisis which started in the fourth
quarter of 2007 and finished in the second quarter of 2009, as defined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html, the non-California
banks outperformed California banks. However, towards the end of the financial crisis
California banks have better average return on equity ratio, which rejects the working
null hypothesis of the study. This means that it might be difficult to give an
unambiguous answer to the research question of the study.
FIGURE 1
TEMPORAL BEHAVIOR OF RETURN ON EQUITY
0.2

0.1

0
200212

200412

200703

200903

NonCA ROE
CA ROE

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

The temporal behavior of return on assets of California and non-California banks
is depicted on Figure 2. Again, prior to the financial crisis non-California banks
outperformed California banks; however, towards the end of the crisis California banks
have better average return on assets but this better performance almost disappears in
the end of the period. In contrast, the California banks superior return on equity ratios
towards the end of the period is much more pronounced and does not disappear.
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FIGURE 2
TEMPORAL BEHAVIOR OF RETURN ON ASSETS
0.025
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of macro variables used in this study. The
descriptive statistics table shows average negative expected inflation rate in the period
indicating deflationary sentiment in the economy. However, the average unexpected
inflation in the period also appears to be negative indicating that the expectations of
deflationary environment on average did not materialize. These facts only indicate the
highly volatile state of the economy in the examined period which can be explained with
the recent financial and economic crisis.
TABLE 2
MACRO VARIABLES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
UTS
34
0.0205
0.0127
-0.0038
0.0358
DEI
34 -0.1521
0.8631
-3.5351
0.8622
UI
34 -0.0151
0.0115
-0.0423
0.0027
MP
34
0.0008
0.0201
-0.0610
0.0221
UPR
34
0.0263
0.0103
0.0156
0.0601
OP
34
0.0562
0.1771
-0.6050
0.4527
UTS is the spread between long and short term interest rates, DEI is expected inflation,
UI is unexpected inflation, MP is change in industrial production, UPR is high and low
grade bonds spread, and OP is change in oil price.
Similar to Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) I compute cross correlations among the
macro variables. Table 3 provides these correlation coefficients. The table provides

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 13, 2012

8
Pearson Correlation Coefficients. The largest correlation coefficients are among the
change in industrial production and the spread between high and low grade bonds.
TABLE 3
MACRO VARIABLES CORRELATION TABLE
UTS
DEI
UI
MP
UPR
OP
UTS
1.0000
DEI
-0.1717
1.0000
UI
0.2165
-0.1783
1.0000
MP
-0.0876
0.6253
0.1519
1.0000
UPR
0.4941
-0.5735
-0.0763
-0.7938
1.0000
OP
0.0987
-0.1775
0.6509
0.2273
-0.2995
1.0000
UTS is the spread between long and short term interest rates, DEI is expected inflation,
UI is unexpected inflation, MP is change in industrial production, UPR is high and low
grade bonds spread, and OP is change in oil price. Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N =
34.
The highest correlation here is different from the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986)
study. Chen, Roll, and Ross find that the largest correlation is between the spread of
long and short term rates and the spread of high and low grade bonds. This difference
might be due to a structural change in the economy due to the proliferation of junk
bonds in recent times in contrast to the conditions at the time of the Chen, Roll, and
Ross (1986) conducted over two decades ago. This difference might also be intensified
by the financial crisis.
Next, I study how sensitive are the returns of banks in California and the rest of
the Twelfth Federal Reserve Bank District to the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) macro
factors. Table 4 provides multivariate cross section - time series analysis results for
California and non-California banks when the dependent variable is returns on equity.
The multivariate analysis is performed based on a model as defined in equation (1). The
non-California banks’ factor loadings are higher than the factor loadings of California
banks either when return on equity or return on assets is used as the dependent
variable.
When I examine return on equity not all macro factors are statistically
significant. The expected and unexpected inflation and industrial production factors
have statistically significant loadings for both the California and non-California samples
and in addition the non-California sample has the difference between long and short
term yields also as being statistically significant. Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) also find
that the change in oil prices is not statistically significant; however, they find that the
difference between long and short term yields and high and low grade bonds are
statistically significant. This is in contrast to my findings but it might be due to the fact
that I do not use market data for the banks that I study.
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TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RETURN ON EQUITY AND RETURN ON ASSETS
Dependent Variable:
Return On Equity
Return On Assets
Independent
California
Non-California
California
Non-California
Variable
Coefficient
p-value
Coefficient
p-value Coefficient
p-value
Coefficient
p-value
Intercept
0.0504***
<0.001 0.0852***
<0.001 0.0057***
<0.001
0.0267*** <0.001
UTS
-0.0636
0.295 -0.4012***
0.001 -0.0146*
0.084
-0.0682***
0.005
DEI
0.0064***
<0.001 0.0136***
<0.001 0.0005***
<0.001
0.0009**
0.017
UI
0.2054***
0.001 0.3642***
0.002 0.0199**
0.019
0.0314
0.203
MP
-0.1772***
0.001 -0.5959***
<0.001 0.0075
0.332
-0.0053
0.812
UPR
-0.0651
0.667 -0.2782
0.354 0.0106
0.613
0.0244
0.691
OP
0.0007
0.870 -0.0003
0.972
0.0003
0.632
0.0011
0.545
Crisis
-0.0374***
<0.001 -0.0486***
<0.001 -0.0033***
<0.001
-0.0042*** <0.001
LDEP
-0.0012**
0.038 0.0018*
0.073 -0.0009***
<0.001
-0.0004*
0.065
OFFDOM
-0.000019*
0.056 -0.000026**
0.042 0.000003**
0.013
-0.000001
0.729
SMALL BANK
-0.0335***
<0.001 -0.0174***
<0.001 -0.0078***
<0.001
-0.0057*** <0.001
MEDIUM BANK
-0.0100***
<0.001 -0.0044
0.134 -0.0023***
<0.001
-0.0015**
0.011
LARGE BANK
0.0205***
<0.001 0.0175**
0.013
0.0016**
0.020
0.0014
0.325
INSTCRD
0.0280***
<0.001
0.0061*** <0.001
INSSAVE
0.0038**
0.033 -0.0012
0.712
0.0009***
<0.001
-0.0003
0.674
DR
0.0054
0.310 -0.0571***
<0.001 0.0116***
<0.001
-0.0179*** <0.001
N
9689
10477
9691
10480
Adjusted R-Squared
0.1752
0.0850
0.1906
0.0392
UTS is the spread between long and short term interest rates, DEI is expected inflation, UI is unexpected inflation, MP is
change in industrial production, UPR is high and low grade bonds spread, and OP is change in oil price, crisis is a dummy
variable of one after crisis starting in the fourth quarter of 2007 and zero otherwise, LDEP is natural logarithm of total
bank deposits and OFFDOM is the number of domestic offices, DR is debt ratio. SMALL BANK take a value of 1 for assets
up to $100 million, MEDIUM BANK take a value of 1 for assets between $300 million and $1 billion, and LARGE BANK
takes a value of 1 if assets exceed $15 billion. INSTCRCD is a dummy variable for credit card institution and INSSAVE is
insured savings institution. Significant difference from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted with *, ** and ***,
respectively.
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All statistically significant coefficients are larger for the non-California sample
than they are for the California sample. For example, the expected and unexpected
inflation and industrial production coefficients for the California sample are 0.0064,
0.2054 and -0.1772, respectively, whereas the coefficients for the same macro factors
but for the non-California sample are almost twice as high, 0.0136, 0.3642 and -0.5959,
respectively.
When I examine return on assets only the spread between long and short term
interest rates and expected inflation factor loadings are statistically significant. The
California sample spread between long and short term interest rates and expected
inflation factor loadings are -0.0146 and 0.0005, respectively; whereas the nonCalifornia sample factor loadings are again almost double, -0.0682 and 0.0009,
respectively.
The higher regression coefficients mean that the non-California banks exhibit
higher sensitivity to the macroeconomic conditions and also that they bear more macro
risk. The higher risk explains the higher returns in the expansion period of the economic
cycle but also explains the underperformance of the non-California banks in the
recession period of the business cycle. This fact that non-California banks are more
sensitive to the macro conditions suggests that non-California banks in the 12th Federal
Reserve District are more interstate oriented relative to California banks. This also
suggests that California banks appear to be still more focused on the local California
economy.
I use control variables as designated in equation (1) to account for company
specific factors and factors identified in the prior literature as potentially having an
impact on the bank performance in the period besides the macro factors. The control
variables that I use in this study are a dummy variable accounting for the crisis period
starting in 2007, total bank deposits, number of domestic bank offices, small, medium
and large banks dummy variables, credit card institution dummy, insured commercial
banks and insured savings institutions dummy variables and debt ratio.
Zou, Miller and Malamud (2011) use the following bank categories: small banks banks with assets up to $100 million, next to small banks with assets between $100
million and $300 million, medium sized banks - banks with assets between $300
million and $1 billion, banks next to large banks with assets between $1 billion and $15
billion, and large banks - banks with assets exceeding $15 billion. In a similar fashion I
separate the sample of California and non-California banks into groups; however I use
only three groups, small, medium and large banks and use dummy variables to identify
these banks. I also control for credit card institutions. Credit card institutions are those
banks which have total loans greater than 50% of total assets and credit card loans
greater than 50% of total loans. Note that there are no credit card institutions in
California.
The control variables are mostly significant when either return on equity or
return on assets is used as a dependent variable. The dummy variable for the crisis
period is negative indicating that during the recession both return on equity and return
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on assets decrease. The coefficient is larger for the non-California sample, -0.0486,
compared to -0.0374 for the California sample when return on equity is the dependent
variable (when return on assets is the dependent variable the coefficients are -0.0042
and -0.0033 for the non-California and California samples, respectively) suggesting
much greater underperformance of non-California banks relative to California banks
during the crisis.
The regression results also show that the larger the bank institution (California or
non-California), in terms of total assets, the higher the performance measure (both
return on equity and return on assets); alternatively, the smaller the bank institution (in
both regions) the lower the bank performance. Insured savings institutions tend to have
higher performance and statistical importance in California whereas there is no
statistical importance of this characteristic for non-California banks. The California
banks sample is also characterized with lack of credit card institutions. It is natural to
assume that credit card institutions are more nationwide oriented than savings and
commercial bank institutions which might help explain the higher macro risk sensitivity
of non-California banks and more local orientation of California banks.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Robustness tests are conducted to examine the stability of the macro variables
regression coefficients. The additional robustness tests are performed by using different
model specification based on excluding variables from the regression model defined in
equation (1). The macro factor loading results are robust to the alternative model
specifications. As an additional robustness check a commercial bank dummy is used
instead of the savings bank dummy because both dummy variables cannot be used at
the same time in order to have a specified model. Results are the same regardless which
dummy variable is used, the insured commercial institution or the insured saving
institution dummy variable.
As an additional robustness test I use market returns instead of ROE and ROA.
The market returns are obtained from CRSP. However, the CERTs available in the
original Federal Reserve database cannot be used in CRSP. The only way to obtain CRSP
data is by matching CERT numbers, RSSID numbers and PERMCOs. I manually
retrieve each bank’s RSSID number by matching it with the banks CERT number
through the Federal Reserve’s website: http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/
SearchForm.aspx. Then I identify the banks PERMCO by matching the bank’s RSSID to
its corresponding PERMCO through the New York Fed’s database of RSSID and
PERMCO’s. The New York Fed’s website, which has been used to obtain RSSIDs and
PERMCOs is: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html.
After I obtain the PERMCOs I retrieve market return data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP).
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N
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

TABLE 5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, BANKS WITH MARKET DATA
California Banks
Net
Return
Return
QRET
Assets
Equity
Income
On Equity On Assets
1002
1002
1002
1002
1002
1002
0.0011
4247533
487057
22169
7.40%
0.88%
0.2256
8260261
1177925
69431
21.83%
2.27%
-0.8779
132590
11264
-537335 -244.90%
-28.37%
1.2039
66890239
9028897
572032
91.97%
16.39%

Debt
Ratio
1002
0.88%
0.12%
0.06%
0.98%

Non-California Banks
Net
Return
Return
Debt
QRET
Assets
Equity
Income
On Equity On Assets
Ratio
N
636
636
636
636
636
636
636
Mean
-0.0069
4080026
1147487
16855
2.12%
0.46%
0.87%
Standard Deviation
0.2320
6837059
4777915
108214
28.55%
2.01%
0.13%
Minimum
-0.7648
15861
-11085
-830332 -318.16%
-13.45%
0.03%
Maximum
2.5266
46048007
31921253
1059404
54.62%
5.72%
1.02%
QRET is quarterly bank stock returns. Assets is total assets, and Equity is total shareholders’ equity. Assets, Equity, and
Net Income are in dollars. Data is fourth quarter of 2002 until first quarter of 2011.
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Naturally, the sample of California and non-California banks shrank, because
only large organizations are publically traded. The sample of unique California banks
decreased to 45 banks; whereas the sample of non-California banks decreased to 25
unique institutions. Thus, even though the banks in the non-California 12th district are
larger, they tend not to be publicly traded.
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the banks left in the sample over the
examined period. Clearly, contrary to the working null hypothesis of the paper the
California banks on average outperform non-California banks. The California banks
average quarterly return is 0.11%, whereas the non-California banks average quarterly
return is -0.69% over the examined period. The California banks average ROE is also
higher than the non-California banks returns, 7.4% against 2.12%, respectively, but the
California banks ROA is lower. In contrast to the full sample of banks, the California
banks with publicly traded stocks are larger when assets are used than non-California
banks, whereas in the full sample non-California banks are larger.
TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR QUARTERLY STOCK RETURNS
Variable
Coefficient
p-value
Coefficient
p-value
0.2642***
0.001
0.3779**
0.027
Intercept
7.4433***
<.001
4.8821***
<.001
UTS
-0.0567***
<.001
-0.0351**
0.024
DEI
0.0393
0.960
-1.0173
0.325
UI
-0.4827
0.507
-0.6108
0.536
MP
-12.2982***
<.001
-9.9875***
<.001
UPR
-0.2499***
<.001
-0.2456***
0.002
OP
-0.0971***
<.001
-0.0917***
0.001
Crisis
0.0046
0.472
-0.0209*
0.055
LDEP
-0.0004***
0.001
0.0006**
0.044
OFFDOM
SMALL BANK
0.0037
0.922
0.0029
0.945
MEDIUM BANK
0.1135***
0.005
0.0157
0.770
LARGE BANK
-0.0183
0.384
0.0005
0.979
INSSAVE
-0.1149
0.201
0.0669
0.498
DR
1002
636
N
0.1955
0.137
Adjusted R-Squared
UTS is the spread between long and short term interest rates, DEI is expected inflation,
UI is unexpected inflation, MP is change in industrial production, UPR is high and low
grade bonds spread, and OP is change in oil price, crisis is a dummy variable of one after
crisis starting in the fourth quarter of 2007 and zero otherwise, LDEP is natural
logarithm of total bank deposits and OFFDOM is the number of domestic offices, DR is
debt ratio. Dummies are used for medium banks have assets between $300 million and
$1 billion, and large banks have assets exceeding $15 billion. INSSAVE is insured
savings institution. Significant difference from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is
denoted with *, ** and ***, respectively.
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Due to the fact that there are no small publicly traded banks as per the above
discussed criteria and no credit card institutions in California the regression analysis is
performed on all of the equation (1) variables with the exception of the small bank
dummy variable and the credit card dummy variable. The regression results based on
market returns are presented in Table 6.
Similar to the accounting data results California large banks experience higher
market returns. However, in contrast to the accounting data California banks have
suffered slightly more during the recession than non-California banks. If you recall,
when the accounting data and the much larger sample of banks were used, on average,
non-California banks performed worse than California banks, even though both sets of
banks underperformed. This is most likely due to the fact that when market returns are
used the sample is smaller and consists only of large publicly traded banks. Also, in
contrast to the accounting rates of return the macro variables factor loadings are larger
for California banks. This implies higher macro risks for the larger publicly traded
California banks, relative to the larger publicly traded non-California banks. Also, in
contrast to the accounting data results some variables lose statistical significance
whereas other variables gain statistical significance. The variables that lose statistical
significance are the unexpected inflation, change in industrial production, natural
logarithm of total bank deposits, medium banks and the debt ratio variable. The
variables that become significant in the sample of publicly traded banks are the high and
low grade bonds spread and change in oil price.
CONCLUSION
In this study I examine the performance and performance correlation with Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986) macro factors of banks headquartered in California in comparison
to banks headquartered in the rest of the states in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. I
attempt to find an answer to the question: “Do banks in California indeed perform
worse than banks headquartered in the rest of the states in the Twelfth Federal Reserve
District during the most recent crisis?” as suggested by Bardhan and Walker (2010).
I find that prior to the financial crisis which started in the fourth quarter of 2007
and finished in the second quarter of 2009 the non-California banks outperformed
California banks; however, towards the end of the financial crisis California banks have
better average return on assets and return on equity ratios. I also find that the nonCalifornia banks’ factor loadings in the multivariate analysis are higher than the factor
loadings of California banks both when return on equity and return on assets is used as
the dependent variable. The higher regression coefficients mean that the non-California
banks exhibit higher sensitivity to the macro economic conditions and also that they
bear more macro risk. The higher risk explains the higher returns in the expansion
period of the economic cycle but also explains the underperformance of these banks in
the recession period of the business cycle. This fact suggests that non-California banks
in the 12th Federal Reserve District are more interstate oriented relative to California
banks which still tend to be focused on the local California economy. This study can be
used as a model for banking policy modifications. Policymakers can use the framework

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 13, 2012

15
developed in this paper to assess risk in the banking sector from macro perspective,
which is not commonly done considering the regional focus of bank operations.
Naturally, the study has limitations. The Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) is related to
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) framework which has assumptions on the factors
used in the model. The assumptions are that the factors should be related to
undiversifiable risk, should be based on timely data, should be economically justified
and should be unexpected. The argument can be made that banks specialize in a region
and as such suffer from the undiversifiable risk specific for that region. I attempt to
minimize this issue by examining only banks in the 12th Federal Reserve District. Also,
one might argue that the limitation in this study is due to the quarterly Federal Reserve
data used and that higher frequency analysis is required. Of course, these limitations are
great opportunities for future research. It would be interesting to examine bank
performance across Federal Reserve Districts and at a higher data frequency.
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